Innovation and the creation, development and destruction of markets in the world machine tool industry

Summary in GermanSIGLEAvailable from Bibliothek des Instituts fuer Weltwirtschaft, ZBW, Duesternbrook Weg 120, D-24105 Kiel W 179 (92.20) / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Too big to fail ? ! Leçons de la crise financière

This article examines the emergence and evolution of the “ Too-Big-To-Fail” (TBTF) doctrine based on various case studies, identifying moral hazard as the cause for externalities. It examines the role of TBTF within the recent financial crisis with regard to its contribution to and appearance in the crisis. In drawing lessons from the current crisis, a broader concept of systemic relevance is developed building on bank characteristics beyond sheer size. Referred to as “ Systemically Important Financial Institutions” by the Financial Stability Board, it is argued that these banks should be regulated rather than downsized or broken up considering the advantages of having large diversified global banks. The article evaluates FSB’s proposed regulatory measures, including capital surcharges, resolution regimes, enhanced supervision and improved core financial infrastructure, and identifies resolution regimes as the most efficient mechanisms to counter TBTF. If designed appropriately, such resolution regimes could convert TBTF into TBDF, or “ Too Big for Disorderly Failure”. Finally, the article warns that in reaching a new equilibrium in the financial system, unintended consequences such as concentration, competitive distortion and regulatory arbitrage have to be taken into account. Classification JEL : G21, G28, E51.Cet article examine l’apparition et l’évolution de la doctrine too big to fail (TBTF) («trop grand pour faire faillite » ) à la lumière de plusieurs études de cas et identifie l’aléa moral comme cause d’externalités. Il analyse le rôle joué par la doctrine TBTF dans la récente crise financière et se penche sur son apparition et sa participation à ladite crise. Si l’on tire les conséquences de la crise, le concept élargi d’importance systémique se nourrit d’autres caractéristiques que la taille des banques. Au vu des avantages que présentent les grandes banques globales diversifiées, ces «institutions financières d’importance systémique » (IFIS), comme les appelle le Conseil de stabilité financière, devraient faire l’objet de réglementations plutôt que se voir réduites ou démantelées. L’article propose une analyse des mesures réglementaires proposées par le CSF, notamment les surcharges en capital, le renforcement du contrôle, l’amélioration de l’infrastructure financière clé et les régimes de résolution, ce dernier mécanisme étant le plus efficient pour limiter les TBTF. Bien conçus, ces régimes de résolution pourraient convertir les TBTF en TBDF (too big for disorderly failure), des établissements trop grands pour une faillite chaotique. Enfin l’article souligne que pour parvenir à un nouvel équilibre du système financier, il faut tenir compte des conséquences involontaires telles que la concentration, la distorsion de la concurrence et l’arbitrage réglementaire. Classification JEL : G21, G25, E51.Moenninghoff Sébastien C., Wieandt Axel. Too big to fail ? ! Leçons de la crise financière. In: Revue d'économie financière, n°101, 2011. Le risque systémique 2. Repenser la supervision. pp. 231-257

The perennial challenge to counter Too-Big-to-Fail in banking: Empirical evidence from the new international regulation dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks

This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and designation events. We observe that the new regulation negatively affects the value of the newly regulated banks, yet that the official designation of banks as “globally systemically important” itself has a partly offsetting positive impact. A cross-sectional analysis of the valuation effects with respect to, for example, government ownership of banks supports the view that the positive reaction to these designations can be attributed to a Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) perception by investors. The fact that these valuation effects emerge from a regulation specifically designed to reduce the costs and risks of Too-Big-to-Fail demonstrates the inherently paradoxical nature of the new regulation. These results further suggest that even though the individual components of the regulation have been effective, revealing the identities of G-SIBs eliminated ambiguity about the presence of government guarantees, and thereby may have run counter to the regulators’ intent to contain the effects of TBTF

The perennial challenge to counter Too-Big-To-Fail in banking: Empirical evidence from the new international regulation dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks

This paper provides evidence on how the new international regulation on Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) impacts the market value of large banks. We analyze the stock price reactions for the 300 largest banks from 52 countries across 12 relevant regulatory announcement and designation events. We observe that the new regulation negatively affects the value of the newly regulated banks, yet that the official designation of banks as “globally systemically important” itself has a partly offsetting positive impact. A cross-sectional analysis of the valuation effects with respect to, for example, government ownership of banks supports the view that the positive reaction to these designations can be attributed to a Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) perception by investors. The fact that these valuation effects emerge from a regulation specifically designed to reduce the costs and risks of Too-Big-to-Fail demonstrates the inherently paradoxical nature of the new regulation. These results further suggest that even though the individual components of the regulation have been effective, revealing the identities of G-SIBs eliminated ambiguity about the presence of government guarantees, and thereby may have run counter to the regulators’ intent to contain the effects of TBTF.publisher: Elsevier articletitle: The perennial challenge to counter Too-Big-to-Fail in banking: Empirical evidence from the new international regulation dealing with Global Systemically Important Banks journaltitle: Journal of Banking & Finance articlelink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.01.017 content_type: article copyright: Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.status: publishe

Die Entstehung von Maerkten durch Innovationen

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